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Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the 
Diversionary Use of Force
Ross A. Miller
Department of Political Science
Santa Clara University
This study explores the relative propensity of democratic and autocrat-
ic regimes to engage in diversionary behavior. Although previous research 
has focused on the willingness of leaders to engage in conflict, recent stud-
ies suggest an alternative explanation: the effect of strategic interaction op-
portunities. Previous studies suggest that even though democratic leaders 
may have an incentive to use foreign policy to manipulate domestic audi-
ences, would-be adversaries limit their interaction opportunities. This arti-
cle extends the analysis to a comparison of the behavior of democratic and 
autocratic regimes. Using three different indicators of the domestic political 
vulnerability of leaders—economic growth rates, protests, and rebellions—
the results indicate that democratic leaders are apparently more affected by 
strategic interaction opportunities than their autocratic counterparts.
Foiiowing the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, the New York 
Times reported that “Political leaders here. . . agree [that President Leopoldo Galt-
ieri] has greatly enhanced his political power and stature.”1 Similarly, in the 1997-
1998 dispute between the United States and Iraq over the access of United Nations 
inspection teams to suspected nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons sites, 
some observers attributed the Clinton adminis tration’s threat to use military force 
to domestic political problems. Charges of diversionary (or scapegoat) behavior 
on the part of leaders are certainly not new in the history of the United States or 
world history generally. Levy (1989, 263-265), for example, cites a number of qual-
itative studies that trace the international conflict behavior of nations to internal 
problems. Morgan and Bickers (1992, 26-27) suggest that “in fact, it might not be 
an overstatement to suggest that virtually every war since 1800 has been attribut-
ed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems.”
Surprisingly, however, many of the attempts to assess the relationship quanti-
tatively have concluded that this is most likely not the case, whereas other studies 
have produced mixed findings. There are a number of explanations for the lack of
1New York Times, April 6, 1982 (originally cited in Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, 
841).
Author’s note: I am grateful to Bob Jackman, Steve Nicholson, Randy Siverson, and Alastair 
Smith for helpful comments. Data are available upon request via e-mail: rmiller10@unl.edu 
(2012 affiliation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
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consistency between theory and empirical evidence. One of the more obvious, of 
course, is that the theory is simply wrong. Although their arguments are limited 
to research on U.S. presidents and the political use of force, Meernik and Water-
man (1996, 577) contend that “it does not make theoretical sense to expect presi-
dents will behave according to the logic of the diversionary model on a regular ba-
sis.” Morgan and Bickers (1992, 28) point to a second possible explanation: all too 
often diversionary theory is treated as “a universal dictum of state behavior rath-
er than as a partial explanation of some foreign policy decisions.” Thus, given the 
myriad possible explanations for any decision to use military force, empirically 
it may be difficult to isolate the many cases in which the motivation to divert the 
public’s attention from domestic political problems is the primary reason for the 
use of military force.
Leeds and Davis (1997) point to a third explanation: the effect of strategic inter-
action. Based on research by Smith (1996), Leeds and Davis argue that although 
democratic leaders may be willing to engage in diversionary behavior, would-be 
adversaries anticipate this willingness and limit their interactions with those lead-
ers. Using a set of 18 industrial democracies, Leeds and Davis find no evidence of 
diversionary behavior.
The focus of this study is on the argument of Leeds and Davis (1997) that strate-
gic interaction opportunities influence the behavior of leaders. This article builds 
and extends the research of Leeds and Davis in three ways. First, it evaluates the 
extent to which strategic interaction opportunities influence the behavior of dem-
ocratic and autocratic leaders. Second, it distinguishes between states thatjoin an 
ongoing dispute and states that were original participants, since the former have 
greater opportunities than the latter. Finally, by building selection effects into the 
research design, the test for the influence of strategic interaction opportunities is 
made even more conservative.
THEORETICAL LITERATURE
The idea that leaders use foreign policy to manipulate domestic audiences is 
not new. In an often-cited quote, Bodin (1955, 168) suggests that “the best way of 
preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is 
to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy 
against whom they can make common cause.” More recently, Wright (1965, 727) 
opined that war is a “necessary or convenient means . . . to establish, maintain, or 
expand the power of a government, party, or class within a state.”
Much of the theoretical literature is rooted in the in-group/out-group thesis of 
Simmel (1955), who contends that the cohesion of an in-group will increase in the 
presence of conflict with an out-group (see also Coser 1956; Stein 1976). Research 
in U.S. politics suggests that the theory applies at the national level as well as the 
group level.
Mueller (1970, 1973), Brody and Page (1975), and MacKuen (1983) all report that 
popular support for presidents increases in response to foreign policy activity, a 
phenomenon that is often dubbed the “rally around the flag” effect. Assuming 
that leaders in power wish to retain power and that they will use domestic and 
foreign policies to manipulate domestic audiences, the contention that leaders en-
gage in diversionary behavior appears reasonable (see also Leeds and Davis 1997; 
Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996).
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EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
In perhaps the first quantitative study in this genre, Rummel (1963) found no re-
lationship between the internal and external conflict behavior of 77 nations during 
the period from 1955 to 1957, and subsequent replications and cross-validations of 
his analysis generally support his conclusion (Burrowes and Spector 1973; Tanter 
1966; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971; Wilkenfeld 1972). Wilkenfeld’s (1968) study is 
an exception. His research suggests that authoritarian regimes were more likely to 
go to war when faced with revolution at home, whereas polyarchic regimes were 
more likely to engage in conflict in light of domestic turmoil (see also Hazelwood 
1973). Although Wilkenfeld provides some evidence of a link between internal 
and external conflict based on regime type, he does not offer a theoretical expla-
nation for why this relationship should exist. Based on his review of this research, 
Levy (1989, 263) concludes that “although the results of some of the controlled 
studies are somewhat more encouraging, few of the findings indicate strong rela-
tionships.” This may in part account for what appears to be a noticeable decrease 
in research on diversionary theory between 1975 and 1985.
Publication of Ostrom and Job’s 1986 article on the determinants of the conflict 
behavior of U.S. presidents, however, brought about renewed interest in the sub-
ject. Of the 10 domestic and international variables included in their study, presi-
dential approval ratings had the most pronounced effect on decisions to use force 
(Ostrom and Job 1986,557). Studies by James and Oneal (1991), Morgan and Bick-
ers (1992), and DeRouen (1995) offer additional evidence that declining levels of 
support provide U.S. presidents with an incentive to pursue aggressive foreign 
policies. In a similar vein, Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991), and 
Wang (1996) found that changes in the “misery index” were linked to the use of 
force by U.S. presidents, and Stoll (1984) and Nincic (1990) concluded that the elec-
toral cycle influences foreign policy decisions.
In stark contrast, Meernik (1994) and Meernik and Waterman (1996) question 
both the logic behind and the empirical support for diversionary behavior on the 
part of U.S. presidents. Leeds and Davis (1997) also question the idea that empir-
ical evidence of diversionary behavior should exist. Drawing on an argument ad-
vanced by Smith (1996), Leeds and Davis contend that the vast majority of the 
quantitative analyses of diversionary theory fail to take selection effects into ac-
count. According to Smith, despite the effect that approval ratings, the economy, 
and the electoral cycle have on the willingness of leaders to engage in diversion-
ary behavior, we may not see greater diversionary behavior on the part of demo-
cratic leaders empirically because other states will purposefully alter their behav-
ior (where possible) to limit interaction opportunities during periods when dem-
ocratic leaders appear to be politically vulnerable. In their study of 18 industrial 
democracies, Leeds and Davis (1997, 831) report that there is very little evidence 
of diversionary behavior on the part of leaders and attribute this finding to selec-
tion effects.
These results are similar to those reported by Miller (1995), who found no rela-
tionship between changes in economic growth and the dispute behavior of dem-
ocratic leaders. Drawing on research by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), 
Miller suggests that because democratic leaders generally anticipate higher do-
mestic political costs for using force abroad than their authoritarian counterparts, 
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they should be less prone to attempt to divert domestic attention by pursuing mil-
itarized foreign policies.
In contrast, Gelpi (1997) found a positive interactive effect between democracy 
and internal turmoil (measured in terms of protests and rebellions) and the level 
of force used in a crisis. Gelpi contends that the repressive capacities of autocrat-
ic leaders make them less willing than democratic leaders to pursue diversionary 
foreign policies when faced with domestic turmoil.
Setting aside the apparently contradictory empirical findings of Gelpi (1997) 
and Miller (1995), as Leeds and Davis (1997) point out, both of these approach-
es are somewhat limited on theoretical grounds because they do not take into ac-
count the role of strategic interaction in the formulation of their hypotheses (Leeds 
and Davis 1997, 820-22; see also Smith 1996). Gelpi (1997) and Miller (1995) focus 
on the willingness of leaders to undertake diversionary behavior, whereas Leeds 
and Davis (1997) and Smith (1996) focus on interaction opportunities.
This article provides an opportunity to compare the relative effect of strategic 
interaction opportunities on democratic and autocratic leaders. To address this 
question, an attempt has been made to make the test as conservative as possible 
by building selection effects into the research design. By using the militarized in-
terstate dispute (MID) (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) as the unit of analysis, I 
have isolated instances in which would-be diverters are already engaged in a dis-
pute with another nation and have therefore selected themselves into a situation 
where diversionary actions would be easier to undertake than if they were not in-
volved in a dispute. This provides an even more conservative test of the argu-
ments of Smith (1996) and the empirical findings of Leeds and Davis (1997) that 
even though leaders may be willing to engage in diversionary behavior, other 
leaders alter their behavior to limit the opportunities of these diversionary-prone 
leaders. Given that the unit of analysis here is the dyadic dispute, it will be even 
more difficult for other states to limit conflict overall and diversionary behavior 
in particular.
The new MID data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) also enables the control 
for possible diffusion effects that can influence strategic interaction opportunities 
(Siverson and Starr 1991). After all, World War II actually began as the German-
Polish War of 1939, and other states subsequently joined one side or the other. If 
we consider the foreign policy choice set of leaders at any given point of time, it 
appears reasonable to argue that even if leaders are willing to engage in diversion-
ary behavior, they may be unable to do so because of a lack of opportunity (Smith 
1996; Leeds and Davis 1997).
On the other hand, an ongoing conflict presents leaders with the choice of join-
ing one side or the other; that is, it provides an opportunity. Therefore, the analy-
ses below distinguish between the conflict behavior of the original participants of 
the dispute and those that joined the dispute.
Moreover, this analysis provides an opportunity to evaluate one possible expla-
nation for the contrasting results of Gelpi (1997) and Miller (1995). Whereas Mill-
er looked at the responses of targets of disputes, Gelpi’s study focused on dispute 
initiators. To evaluate the possibility that the conflicting results reported above 
are simply a function of the different behavior of targets and initiators, the statis-
tical research below performs separate analyses of the dispute behavior of initia-
tors and targets.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
The dependent variable, force, is based on the codings used in the recently up-
dated MID data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; see also Gochman and Maoz 
1984). In the analyses below, force takes the value of 0 for cases in which the dis-
pute participant either did nothing or threatened or displayed force, 1 for instanc-
es in which minor levels of military force were used, and 2 for cases in which the 
use of force resulted in at least 1,000 battle deaths.
Three separate indicators of domestic political problems are used: changes in 
economic growth rates, levels of rebellion, and levels of protest. The first, economic 
growth, is based on the indicator used by Miller (1995, 770-71) and measured using 
the difference between the percentage rate of growth of per capita gross domestic 
product in the year prior to the dispute (t - 1) and the average growth rate during the 
previous 5 years (t- 2 through t - 6).2 Fortunately, recently released data from Mad-
dison (1995) provide a large temporal range in which to test the effects of changing 
economic growth rates on the dispute behavior of leaders. Maddison provides time 
series economic data for 49 countries for the period from 1820 to 1992. The new MID 
data set covers the period from 1816 to 1992. Miller’s (1995) study was restricted to 
a 20-year period (1956-1976), and thus employing the Maddison (1995) data pro-
vides an ideal way to cross-validate his findings across a much larger time period. 
Gelpi (1997, 265) employed two different indicators of internal unrest, both 
of which were drawn from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III 
(Taylor and Jodice 1986); both will be included in the analysis below. The first in-
dicator, protest, includes “protest demonstrations of government policy, strikes 
or work stoppages aimed primarily at changing government policy and student 
stoppages of normal academic life in protest of government policy” (Gelpi 1997, 
265). The second indicator, rebellion, includes “riots that are directed against gov-
ernment policies, protest demonstrations that turn into riots or combat with po-
lice, and armed attacks by organized groups against the government” (Gelpi 1997, 
265). Both indicators are constructed by taking the average number of activities 
during the 3 months prior to the dispute. Because both of the indicators were bad-
ly skewed,3 it was necessary to transform them by taking the natural logarithm.
Based on the arguments put forth by Meernik (1994), Meernik and Waterman 
(1996), Miller (1995), and Gelpi (1997), two hypotheses will be tested.
Hypothesis 1: Democratic leaders are more likely than autocratic leaders to 
use force when faced with declining levels of support.
Hypothesis 2: Democratic leaders are less likely than autocratic leaders to 
use force when faced with declining levels of support.
Although the arguments of Leeds and Davis (1997) would appear to support the 
latter hypothesis, it is important to point out that they did not state directly whe-
2If the dispute occurred after July 1, the measure is based on the growth rate in that year mi-
nus the average growth rate over the previous 5 years.
3For initiators, the variable rebellion had a mean of 1.5 and a skewness of 6.9; the correspond-
ing figures for protests are 0.7 and 3.9. For targets, the rebellion measure had a mean of 1.5 
and a skewness of 8.3. The figures for protests are 0.8 and 3.5.
Regime Type, STRaTegic inTeRacTion, and The diveRSionaRy USe of foRce 393
ther selection effects should affect democratic leaders any differently than auto-
cratic leaders.
Democracy is based on measures in the Polity III data set (Jaggers and Gurr 
1996; see also Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989), which is an updated and corrected 
version of Polity II. The measure is constructed by subtracting the autocracy mea-
sure from the democracy measure and, following Gelpi (1997, 266), resealing it 
so that it ranges from 0 to 20. In the analyses below, the dispute behavior of more 
democratic states is compared with that of less democratic states. The cutoff point 
on the democracy variable is the median (about 12 on the 20-point scale). The de-
mocracy measure in Polity III is based on codings for four dimensions: the open-
ness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of partic-
ipation, and legislative constraints on the executive. Autocracy includes all of the 
measures used to construct the democracy index, but it also includes the regula-
tion of participation.
I also include a number of control variables. For ease of interpretation, these es-
timates are not reported in the tables below.4
CONTROL VARIABLES
Studies by Leng and Wheeler (1979), Leng (1983), Huth (1988), and Huth and 
Russett (1988) show that the bargaining strategies employed by nations involved 
in a dispute influence the outcome of that dispute. The use of bullying strategies 
(i.e. those characterized by high levels of hostility) by either dispute participant is 
systematically related to the escalation of that dispute to war. Based on this, I in-
clude the level of hostility of the initiator in the analysis of target behavior and the 
level of hostility of the target in the analysis of initiator behavior. Both of these 
measures are drawn from the new MID data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).
A second control variable included in the statistical model is whether the initi-
ator or target was a revisionist state. The justification for the incorporation of this 
variable is also based on studies by Leng and Wheeler (1979), Leng (1983), Huth 
(1988), and Huth and Russett (1988), since it seems reasonable to assume that revi-
sionist states will be more likely to employ bullying strategies and, therefore, elic-
it a more hostile response from the other participant in the dispute, independent 
of the willingness of the target or initiator to escalate the dispute as a result of do-
mestic political problems. This takes the value of 1 if the state is revisionist and 0 
otherwise. As with the hostility variables, I distinguish between targets and initia-
tors. The source for this variable is also the new MID data set (Jones, Bremer, and 
Singer 1996).
A final control variable is the relative power of the dispute participants. This 
measure is similar to that used by Gelpi (1997) and is based on the National Capa-
bilities of States, 1816-1990, data set of the Correlates of War project (Jones, Brem-
er, and Singer 1996). It is based on the relative strength of the initiator and target 
according to an index composed of three indicators: the number of troops, mili-
tary expenditures, and military expenditures per soldier. It is calculated by taking 
the percentage difference between the target and the initiator across these three 
dimensions.
4Estimates are available from the author upon request.
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ANALYSIS
Before preceding with a discussion of the estimates in the three tables below, a 
brief description of their structure is in order. Each of the three tables consists of 
18 different statistical models, all of which include the control variables discussed 
above. As noted above, because of the large number of statistical models (54), pre-
senting the estimates for the control variables would be unwieldy.5
5It should be noted that, as would be expected, the estimates for the control variables were 
not constant across the models reported in Tables 1 through 3. As indicated above (Note 4), 
these estimates are available upon request.
The key difference across the three tables is the indicator used to represent the 
domestic political vulnerability of the leader (economic growth rates in Table 1 
and levels of rebellion and protest in Tables 2 and 3, respectively). The first col-
umn in each table represents estimates for democratic and nondemocratic states, 
whereas the second and third columns break down the original sample for less 
democratic and more democratic states. For the rows, I begin with a discussion of 
the estimates for all of the initiators in the data set. I then distinguish between the 
original initiators in the dispute (row 2) and those states thatjoined the side of the 
initiators (row 3). Immediately below the analysis of the behavior of the initiators, 
the results for the targets are presented.
The structure of the columns and rows is identical to that for the initiators, with 
the columns representing the estimates for democracies and nondemocracies (col-
umn 1), less democratic states (column 2), and more democratic states (column 
3). The rows represent, respectively, all of the targets involved in the dispute fol-
lowed by the original targets and the estimates for those states that joined the side 
of the targets.
Table 1 presents the estimates of an ordered probit analysis evaluating the effect 
of changing economic growth rates on the level of force used. As indicated above, 
the top portion of the table reports the estimates for the initiators of the dispute. 
As the first row indicates, for all initiators (democratic and nondemocratic states), 
the effect of economic growth rates on the level of force is negative and statisti-
cally significant (coefficient = -1.75, z = 2.25). However, when we distinguish be-
tween the behavior of less and more democratic states, it appears that, on statis-
tical grounds, only less democratic states engage in diversionary behavior to any 
significant degree (coefficient = -4.12, z = 3.27). Although the sign of the coefficient 
estimate for more democratic states indicates a negative relationship (-0.26), it is 
not statistically significant (z = 0.25).
These estimates provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2-autocratic lead-
ers should be more likely than democratic leaders to engage in diversionary be-
havior. Moving to the bottom portion of Table 1, we find a similar pattern for 
targets. For all the targets (democratic and autocratic), the estimate for economic 
growth is negative (-1.79) and statistically significant (z = 2.30). When it is broken 
down by level of democracy, only the less democratic states engage in diversion-
ary behavior to any significant degree (coefficient = -2.20, z = 2.24).
When the results are disaggregated to distinguish between the original partic-
ipants in the dispute and those states that joined the dispute (on the side of the
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Table 1
Economic Growth and the Political Use of Force
      Democracies and    Low     High
      Nondemocracies    Democracy    Democracy
Initiators
  All initiators     -1.75*     -4.12*     -0.26
       (2.25)     (3.27)     (0.25)
  N      643     313     330
  Original initiators    0.61     -2.70     2.11
       (0.59)     (1.50)     (1.57)
  N      453     246     207
  Joiners      -6.30*     -6.95*     -4.80
       (4.00)     (3.27)     (1.87)
  N      190     67     123
Targets
  All targets     -1.79*     -2.20*     -1.23
       (2.30)     (2.24)     (0.96)
  N      658     339     319
  Original targets    -1.43     -0.42     -2.64
       (1.17)     (0.23)     (1.55)
  N      384     150     124
  Joiners      -2.44*     -2.88*     0.66
       (2.07)     (2.14)     (0.27)
  N      274     150     124
Note: The entries at the top of each cell are coefficients from an ordered probit analysis that 
includes the key independent variables and the control variables (the latter estimates are not 
reported). Entries in parentheses are z scores, with the number of cases in each model report-
ed directly underneath.
*Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
target or the initiator), the results suggest that although autocratic leaders engage 
in diversionary behavior, the effect holds only for the joiners. Moreover, this effect 
holds for states that joined the side of the initiators (coefficient = -6.95, z = 3.27) and 
those that joined the side of the targets (coefficient = -2.88, z = 2.14). None of the es-
timates for the original participants in the dispute is statistically significant.
The estimates in Table 1 provide a couple of insights. First, they suggest little, if 
any, diversionary behavior on the part of democratic leaders, thereby providing 
support for Hypothesis 2 and the arguments of Leeds and Davis (1997), Meernik 
(1994), Meernik and Waterman (1996), and Miller (1995). They also suggest that au-
tocratic leaders are opportunists-they are more likely to join a dispute at a high lev-
el of force when economic growth is declining. Moreover, it may also suggest addi-
tional evidence of the effect of strategic interaction on the behavior of states. Given 
that the effect of changing economic growth rates on the level of force used is not 
significant for either the democratic or the nondemocratic original participants, it 
may be the case that would-be diverters, in the absence of an ongoing dispute, are 
unable to use conflict involvement to manipulate domestic audiences because other 
states limit the interaction opportunities (i.e., they constrain the choice set of states 
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that appear willing to engage in diversionary behavior). On the other hand, in light 
of an ongoing conflict, the dispute behavior of those autocratic states that join dis-
putes appears to be significantly affected by domestic political conditions.
Table 2 evaluates the extent to which changes in the (natural logarithm of) lev-
el of rebellion influence dispute behavior. These estimates paint a similar, but not 
identical, picture as those in Table 1. Looking at the estimates for the initiators, we 
find that for all states, as the level of rebellion in the prior 3 months of the dispute 
increases, so does the probability that the leader will use high levels of force. Low 
levels of rebellion are associated with relatively low levels of force (coefficient = 
0.43, z = 4.76). When we break down these results by the level of democracy, it 
is once again apparent that less democratic states are more likely than autocratic 
states to engage in diversionary behavior (coefficient = 0.71, z = 5.74). The dispute 
behavior of democratic initiators is apparently unaffected by the level of rebellion 
(coefficient = 0.02, z = 0.15). In contrast to the results reported in Table 1, howev-
er, the original initiators are affected by the level of rebellion (coefficient = 2.45, z 
= 4.30). Although the estimate for the states that joined the side of the initiator(s) 
is positive (0.04) and therefore suggestive of diversionary behavior, it is not signif-
icant using conventional standards (z = 0.25).
The analysis of target behavior reveals results that are more consistent with 
those of Table 1. We find a significant relationship between level of rebellion and 
the level of force used for states that joined the side of the target. However, one 
of the key differences between the estimates reported earlier and the estimates 
here is that less democratic states are apparently unaffected by the level of re-
bellion. None of the estimates is statistically significant. This is consistent with 
Gelpi’s (1997) argument that autocratic leaders can repress rebellions and, there-
fore, have no need to divert attention from internal problems. On the other hand, 
we find a significant negative effect for the democratic states (coefficient = -0.44, z 
= 2.30), and the effect for all of the democratic states is apparently driven by those 
that joined the side of the target (coefficient = -0.9 1, z = 2.84). Morgan and Bickers 
(1992, 29) suggest a possible explanation for the restraining effect of rebellion on 
the behavior of democratic targets: “It may be that by the time domestic problems 
have reached the point of overt, high-level conflict it is too late to divert the pub-
lic’s attention with a foreign adventure.” Although different in subtle ways from 
the estimates in Table 1, overall the results reported in Table 2 provide addition-
al support for Hypothesis 2-democratic leaders are less likely than their autocratic 
counterparts to engage in diversionary behavior.
The results for the effect of the (natural logarithm of) protests on the conflict be-
havior of states are similar to those reported in Table 2. Protests have a restraining 
effect on both initiators and targets, but the effect is seen only for more democrat-
ic states. For the initiators, we note that only the coefficient for states with relative-
ly high levels of democracy that joined the dispute is statistically significant (coef-
ficient = -1.38, z = 2.63), implying that the restraining effect of protests on dispute 
initiators is less pronounced than the effect of rebellion.
Moving down to the lower portion of Table 3, we see a consistent restraining ef-
fect across all types of democratic targets. In each case, the coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. Although there is some evidence of a restraining effect 
of protests on less democratic leaders (coefficient = -0.23), the effect is not statisti-
cally significant (z = 0.86).
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Table 2
Rebellion and the Political Use of Force
      Democracies and    Low     High
      Nondemocracies    Democracy    Democracy
Initiators
     All initiators    0.43*     0.71*     0.02
       (4.76)     (5.74)     (0.15)
  N      416      259    157
     Original initiators   1.37*     2.45*     -0.18
       (5.25)     (4.30)     (0.35)
  N      89      64    25
     Joiners     0.03      0.04    -0.01
       (0.26)     (0.25)     (0.05)
  N      327      195    132
Targets
     All targets     -0.19*     0.10     -0.44*
       (3.94)     (0.68)     (2.30)
  N      415      212    204
     Original targets   -0.15      0.02    -0.31
       (1.27)     (0.10)     (1.88)
  N      314      154    160
     Joiners     -0.43*     0.28     -0.91*
       (2.14)     (0.94)     (2.84)
  N      101      58    43
Note: The entries at the top of each cell are coefficients from an ordered probit analysis that 
includes the key independent variables and the control variables (the latter estimates are not 
reported). Entries in parentheses are z scores, with the number of cases in each model report-
ed directly underneath. *Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
DISCUSSION
The estimates reported in the tables above indicate general support for the ar-
guments advanced by Leeds and Davis (1997) and Smith (1996). For democratic 
leaders, there appears to be no relationship between changing economic growth 
rates and dispute escalation. The same result holds for democratic initiators and 
the effect of levels of protest and rebellion. Democratic targets also are apparently 
restrained in their ability to escalate a dispute when faced with high levels of pro-
test and rebellion.
Autocratic leaders appear to be less affected by strategic interac tion opportuni-
ties than their democratic counterparts. Overall, the results indicate more diver-
sionary behavior empirically on the part of autocratic leaders than their democrat-
ic counterparts. Changing economic growth rates are negatively related to dis-
pute escalation, and this holds for both autocratic initiators and targets. However, 
it is important to note that this relationship is significant only for autocratic lead-
ers who join an ongoing dispute. This makes sense given the arguments of Leeds 
and Davis (1997) with regard to the importance of strategic interaction. An ongo-
ing dispute presents an opportunity to engage in diversionary behavior.
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Table 3
Protests and the Political Use of Force
      Democracies and    Low     High
      Nondemocracies    Democracy    Democracy
Initiators
     All initiators    -0.01     0.35     -0.13
       (0.07)     (1.13)     (0.93)
  N      419     262     157
     Original initiators  0.12     0.29     0.03
       (0.83)     (0.77)     (0.22)
  N      330     198     132
     Joiners     -0.97     2.67     -1.38*
       (1.54)     (1.62)     (2.63)
  N      89     64     25
Targets
     All targets     -0.38*     -0.23     0.43*
       (3.12)     (0.86)     (2.99)
  N      422     219     203
     Original targets   -0.34*     -0.30     -0.42*
       (2.52)     (1.04)     (2.57)
  N      319     159     160
     Joiners     -0.90*     0.91     -0.78*
       (2.67)     (0.97)     (1.97)
  N      103     60     43
Note: The entries at the top of each cell are coefficients from an ordered probit analysis that 
includes the key independent variables and the control variables (the latter estimates are not 
reported). Entries in parentheses are z scores, with the number of cases in each model report-
ed directly underneath. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
On the other hand, the estimates for the effect of rebellions and protest suggest 
that there is no relationship between levels of protest and rebellion and dispute es-
calation for autocratic leaders. Of the 12 models used to test for a relationship be-
tween protest, rebellion, and escalation, only 2 indicate a significant, positive re-
lationship. For the estimates with regard to protests and rebellion, there appears 
to be no relationship between levels of protest and rebellion and dispute escala-
tion. This is consistent with Gelpi’s (1997) argument that because autocratic lead-
ers can repress protests and rebellion, they do not need to resort to diversionary 
behavior.
Neither Miller (1995) nor Gelpi (1997) anticipated the negative relationship be-
tween protest and rebellion and dispute escalation that was found for more dem-
ocratic states. It may be the case, as Morgan and Bickers (1992) contend, that once 
the level of protest and rebellion reaches a certain level, a foreign diversion is un-
likely to help a democratic leader. Moreover, as Leeds and Davis (1997) point out, 
would-be adversaries will limit the interaction opportunities of politically vulner-
able leaders. Overall, the estimates reported in Tables 1 through 3 suggest that, 
empirically, democratic leaders do not appear to be particularly prone to engage 
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in diversionary behavior. If Leeds and Davis (1997) and Smith (1996) are correct, 
this has less to do with the willingness of leaders to engage in diversionary be-
havior—as Meernik (1994), Meernik and Waterman (1996), and Miller (1995) con-
tend—than it does with the opportunities to use foreign policy to manipulate do-
mestic audiences. This, of course, does not mean that we should dismiss the im-
portance of the willingness of leaders to engage in diversionary behavior. As Bue-
no de Mesquita and Siverson (1995, 842) point out, it is reasonable to “assume that 
political leaders are intent on maintaining themselves in power and [will] use the 
available tools of power and rules to accomplish this end.”
A critical question remains: assuming that both democratic leaders and auto-
cratic leaders face domestic pressures that may make diversionary foreign policies 
attractive, why does it appear that democratic leaders are less likely than autocrat-
ic leaders to use foreign policy to manipulate domestic political audiences?
One possible explanation for this centers on the idea that we know less about 
the political position of autocratic leaders than we do about the position of dem-
ocratic leaders. The existence of opinion polls and the general openness of dem-
ocratic societies allow would-be adversaries to estimate the willingness of dem-
ocratic leaders more accurately than that of autocratic leaders to engage in diver-
sionary behavior. Moreover, autocratic leaders depend on a much smaller ruling 
coalition to maintain power; therefore, to estimate accurately an autocratic lead-
er’s political position, it is necessary to understand levels of support within the 
ruling coalition, which can be a difficult undertaking in a relatively closed soci-
ety (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1997). The Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961 is a 
telling example of the consequences of inaccurately estimating the security of an 
adversary’s political position.
CONCLUSION
Generally, the results reported above are consistent with the growing body of 
research (theoretical and empirical) that suggests that democratic states do indeed 
behave differently than their autocratic counterparts. One potentially worthwhile 
avenue for future research is to explore in greater depth the ability of leaders to 
comprehend the political fortunes of would-be adversaries and their likely re-
sponse to demands from other states, and to develop techniques that can improve 
upon our ability to model strategic interaction. Although progress has been made 
in identifying the effect of strategic interaction on international outcomes, to date 
many of the statistical techniques are less than optimal for modeling this phenom-
enon. Smith (1998, 699) sums up the problem nicely:
Suppose nation A, which is powerful, threatens nation B. Being powerful, 
and hence likely to win a fight, nation A will probably carry out its threats. 
Given this nation B sur- renders quickly. Although nation A is prepared to 
use a high level of force, it never has to. Nation B, anticipating A’s future 
escalatory decisions, acquiesces immediately. Nation A never actually uses 
more than threats. [Therefore] ... A’s potential to use violence causes nation 
B to censor our observation of whether A uses higher levels of force.
In the case mentioned above, regardless of whether nation A is strong or weak 
400    milleR in Journal of ConfliCt resolution (JUne 1999) 43(3)
relative to nation B, the outcome may be the same: no use of force. This provides 
a particularly difficult task for understanding the underlying causes of conflict if 
we limit ourselves to standard statistical techniques. Fortunately, research is un-
der way that explicitly focuses on dealing with the interaction problem (Signori-
no 1997; Smith 1997, 1998).
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